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RESOLVING INCONSISTENCIES IN FEDERAL SPECIAL
VERDICTS
INTRODUCTION
Juries are normally requested to return a general verdict'-a finding
for or against the plaintiff that does not state the grounds for the jury's
decision.2 General verdicts have been described as being "as inscrutable
and essentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient
oracle of Delphi."' One way to draw back the veil of secrecy, thereby
revealing the jury's conclusion on each issue in a case, is through the use
of special verdicts. A special verdict is composed of responses by the jury
to a series of questions submitted by the court.4 The questions should
cover all the material issues in a case.' Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Federal Rules)6 governs the use of special verdicts in
1. See Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 929 (1980); Boyce v. Pi Kappa Alpha Holding Corp., 476 F.2d 447, 453-54 (5th Cir.
1973) (Brown, C.J., concurring); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2501, at 484 (1971).
2. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winclder & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19,
29-30 (1962); Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635, 644 (11th Cir.
1984); Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103, 106 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981); Brochu v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1981); Morrissey v. National Maritime Union
of Am., 544 F.2d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Barzelis v. Kulikowski, 418 F.2d 869, 870 (9th
Cir. 1969); Albergo v. Reading Co., 372 F.2d 83, 85-86 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 983 (1967).
3. Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253, 258 (1920); see Co-
lumbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780, 790 n.l 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816
(1948).
4. See Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2676 (1985); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir.
1984); Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1983);
Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929
(1980); McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869, 870-71 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
912 (1979); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 988, 1021-27 (D. Conn. 1978),
affld and remanded, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
A special verdict consists of the group of responses from the jury. Each answer in itself
is not a special verdict. The jury returns a single special verdict, not special verdicts. See
Quaker City, 747 F.2d at 1453.
5. See Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635, 643 (1 1th Cir.
1984); Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 1983); Martinez
v. Union Pac. R.R., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1983); Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566
F.2d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 1978); National Bank of Commerce v. Royal Exch. Assurance of
Am., Inc., 455 F.2d 892, 898 (6th Cir. 1972); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1,
§ 2506, at 499.
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a) states:
Special Verdicts.
The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may
submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief
answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other
method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it
1089
1090 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
federal courts.7 District court judges have broad discretion over whether
the special verdict procedure should be used' and what form the ques-
tions and accompanying instructions should take. 9
Special verdicts have many advantages over general verdicts. Special
verdicts reduce jury confusion in factually and legally complex cases by
identifying and organizing the issues in the case'0 and by simplifying the
deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation and
instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable
the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his
right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such de-
mand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to
have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
7. Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 723 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Johnson v. Richardson, 701 F.2d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1983); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1978); Sadowski v. Bombardier,
Ltd., 539 F.2d 615, 622 (7th Cir. 1976); Gonzales v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 511 F.2d 629,
632 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635, 643 (1 1th Cir. 1984);
Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1515 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 220 (1984); Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1983); Martinez v.
Union Pac. R.R., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1983); Garwood v. International Paper
Co., 666 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1982); Hammerquist v. Clarke's Sheet Metal, Inc., 658
F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds sub nom. Sarkisian v.
Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1983);
Estate of Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1162 (1st Cir. 1980);
Davis v. Oberholtzer, 588 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 1978); Sadowski v. Bombardier, Ltd.,
539 F.2d 615, 622 (7th Cir. 1976); Turchin v. D/A A/S Den Norske Aft., 509 F.2d 101,
104 (2d Cir. 1974); National Bank of Commerce v. Royal Exch. Assurance of Am., Inc.,
455 F.2d 892, 898 (6th Cir. 1972).
9. Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549, 1560 (11th Cir.
1984); Solis v. Rio Grande City Indep. School, 734 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1984); Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Davis
v. Oberholtzer, 588 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 1978); Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp.,
541 F.2d 1047, 1060 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Perzinski v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 503 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1974); National Bank of Commerce v. Royal
Exch. Assurance of Am., Inc., 455 F.2d 892, 898 (6th Cir. 1972); R.H. Baker & Co. v.
Smith-Blair, Inc., 331 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1964); Thorp v. American Aviation & Gen.
Ins. Co., 212 F.2d 821, 830 (3d Cir. 1954).
10. For example, in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978),
affid and remanded, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982), two
photocopier manufacturers were involved in an antitrust suit concerning patent viola-
tions. See id. at 985-87. Evidence was presented for 215 days, summations consumed
almost five days, the jury deliberated for 38 days, and the trial transcript totaled 46,082
pages. Id. at 986. The jury's verdict consisted of responses to 54 questions that outlined
the issues in the case. Id. at 986, 1021-27. The trial judge stated that "the sheer volume
and complexity of the evidence necessitated focusing the jury's attention on specific issues
to be sure that orderly decision-making occurred." Id. at 988. For other comments on the
utility of special verdicts in complex cases, see Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Pick-
ard, 749 F.2d 635, 644 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Ware v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 1983);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Cote v. Estate of Butler, 518 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1975); Brown,
Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 345 (1968); McCormick,
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instructions given to the jury."I Judicial economy also favors special ver-
dicts over general verdicts. If error affects a general verdict, the entire
verdict collapses and all the issues in the case must be relitigated.12 If a
special verdict is used, however, error may only affect a few of the jury's
findings, thus limiting a second trial to the issues covered by the tainted
findings. 3 In some instances, because a special verdict reveals the
grounds for the jury's decision, a second trial can be avoided altogether. 4
Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2 F.R.D. 176, 181 (1943); cf.
Lubasch, Jurors Back Sharon on 2d Key Point in Libel Trial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985,
at Al, col. 4 (commenting that Judge Sofaer decided to use a special verdict rather than a
general verdict because it was the most orderly procedure for the complex case).
11. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 724 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 929 (1980); 2 J. Moore, A. Vestal & P. Kurland, Moore's Manual-Federal Practice
and Procedure § 22.08[l], at 22-78 to -79 (1982); Brown, supra note 10, at 345.46. For an
example of the clarity that special verdicts bring to a case, see the comparison between a
typical special verdict form and a typical general verdict form in McCormick, supra note
10, at 178-79.
12. See Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103, 108 (5th Cir. 1981); Mueller v. Hubbard Milling
Co., 573 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865 (1978); 5A J.
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 49.02 (2d ed. 1984); Sunderland, supra note 3, at 259;
see also Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (The
"naked general verdict.., involves a presumption that the jury found the facts and
reached the legal conclusions undergirding its verdict. [This] practice [leaves] a wide area
of uncertainty on review [and] appellate judges have expressed grave concern over use of
the general verdict in civil cases.").
13. See Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 & n.6 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2676 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d
1480, 1489 (11th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 104 S. CL 1599 (1984); Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 370 F.2d 95, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1009 (1967); Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 93 & n.31 (5th
Cir. 1966); Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affid,
400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969); Brown, supra note 10, at
348. The inefficiency that can result when special verdicts are not used is apparent in
Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case the defendants were charged
with securities laws offenses and common law fraud. Id. at 107. The court of appeals
remanded the case for a retrial because the district court had failed to instruct the jury on
the defense of waiver of fraud. See id. at 107-08. If a special verdict had been used in-
stead of a general verdict, the retrial could have been limited to the waiver of fraud issue.
The court of appeals stated: "Had special verdicts been submitted to the jury, this error
could have been localized thereby permitting the valid portions of the original verdict to
be salvaged." Id. at 108.
14. For example, in Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635 (11 th
Cir. 1984), the case went to the jury on the theories of negligence, gross negligence, and
fraud in the inducement of the contract. Id. at 644. The jury was given a special verdict
form that requested a specific finding on each theory of recovery. Id. The court of appeals
determined that the fraud theory was not a valid basis for recovery and should not have
been submitted to the jury. See id. at 645. If a general verdict had been used, the court of
appeals would not have been able to determine if the verdict for the plaintiff had been
predicated on the valid theories of recovery rather than the invalid theory. See id. Be-
cause a special verdict was used, the court of appeals had proof that the jury had found
for the plaintiff on a valid theory of recovery, thus obviating the need for a retrial. See id.;
see also Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1975)
(noting that district court's failure to utilize special verdict necessitated retrial of all is-
sues), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). For other cases in which courts have commented
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Special verdicts also increase confidence in the fairness and effectiveness
of the jury system by giving litigants and the public a better understand-
ing of how the jury analyzed the case.1 5
One problem with special verdicts is that the jury may return inconsis-
tent responses. In a Fifth Circuit decision, 6 for example, the jury found
in response to one question that the plaintiff's decedent was contribu-
torily negligent, 7 but when asked in another question to state what per-
cent of the total negligence was attributable to him, the jury answered
zero percent.' 8 These responses are obviously inconsistent. The Supreme
Court has held that if, under any view of the case, the inconsistent find-
ings can be reconciled, they must be resolved under that view, and judg-
ment entered on the special verdict. 9 If the findings are irreconcilable,
no judgment may be entered.2 ° The purpose of this Note is to suggest
procedures that federal courts should follow when faced with irreconcila-
ble responses in special verdicts.
Part I of this Note discusses whether district courts should be permit-
ted to resubmit inconsistent findings to the jury for clarification. Part II
is concerned with how and when objections to inconsistencies must be
made in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. This Note con-
cludes that resubmitting inconsistencies to the jury and requiring liti-
gants to object to inconsistencies before the jury has been discharged
further the Federal Rules' goals of speed, economy and fairness.
I. RESUBMITTING INCONSISTENT FINDINGS
Whether a district court is permitted to resubmit inconsistent re-
sponses to the jury can have a substantial effect on the outcome of the
on the ability of special verdicts to prevent retrials, see Cappellini v. McCabe Powers
Body Co., 713 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1983); Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto, 660 F.2d 1275,
1283-84 & n.14 (8th Cir. 1981); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
279 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
15. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 816 (1948); Sunderland, supra note 3, at 259; see also Petes v. Hayes, 664 F.2d 523,
526 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e specifically approve of the district court's use of special inter-
rogatories, which avoid the 'inscrutable mystery of a general verdict [and] impenetrable
uncertainty .... .' ") (quoting Tugwell v. A.F. Klaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866, 868 n.2
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964)).
16. Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1977).
17. Id. at 158-59.
18. Id. at 159.
19. See Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962). Lower federal courts have
followed the Supreme Court's position. See Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 475 (1st Cir.
1985); Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 746 F.2d 1087, 1092 (5th Cir. 1984); Andrasko v. Cham-
berlain Mfg. Corp., 608 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir. 1979); Bernardini v. Rederi A/B Saturnus,
512 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); Andrasko v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 608 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir.
1979); Bernardini v. Rederi A./B Saturnus, 512 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1975); Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 362 F.2d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1004 (1967).
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case. An example of this effect is McCollum v. Stahl,21 a civil rights ac-
tion in which the plaintiff contended that he had been wrongfully dis-
charged from his job as a deputy sheriff.' The case was submitted to the
jury under Rule 49(a).23 The special verdict concluded that the defend-
ant had not acted wrongfully, but that the plaintiff had been discharged
in a malicious fashion and should receive $15,000 in punitive damages.24
Faced with these inconsistent responses, the district court resubmitted
the responses to the jury for clarification.25 The jury then changed its
responses, finding that the defendant had acted wrongfully, and awarding
$3750 in compensatory damages and $3750 in punitive damages.26 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit held as a matter of law that the responses
should not have been resubmitted. 7 The court reversed the verdict
against the defendant, relying on the jury's original finding that the de-
fendant had not acted wrongfully.28
A. Textual Analysis
The Fourth Circuit in McCollum argued that inconsistent special ver-
dicts cannot be resubmitted to the jury because of the structure of Rule
49(a).29 Because Rule 49(a) does not contain any provision allowing for
resubmission, the court of appeals concluded that the proper inference is
that resubmission is impermissible.3" The court of appeals arrived at this
result3 by comparing Rule 49(a) with Rule 49(b).32 Rule 49(b), which
21. 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978) (cited as controlling on the issue of resubmission of
inconsistent special verdicts in 1 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice Rules Pamphlet R
49, at 472 (1985)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979).
22. See id. at 869-70.
23. Id. at 871.
24. Id. at 870.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 871.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 871, 873.
29. See id. at 871; Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
30. McCollum, 579 F.2d at 871.
31. One reason the Fourth Circuit should not be followed on this point is because its
determination was based on dicta in a Fifth Circuit decision, Griffin v. Matheme, 471
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1973), which has been disregarded by subsequent Fifth Circuit deci-
sions. In Griffin, the court suggested in a footnote that because Rule 49(a) does not have a
specific provision allowing for resubmission, the presumption should be that resubmission
is impermissible. Id. at 917 n.6. Although the Fifth Circuit expressed concern about
resubmission in Perricone v. Kansas City S. Ry., 704 F.2d 1376, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983), in
the other decisions in which the issue has arisen, resubmission has been approved, see
Alverez v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 674 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (5th Cir. 1982); Mercer v.
Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1982); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 604
F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d
1001, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F.2d 154, 161 (5th Cir.
1977) (submitting supplemental questions to the jury is an acceptable way to resolve an
inconsistency).
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b) states:
General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories.
The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
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covers the use of general verdicts with interrogatories, contains provi-
sions that allow inconsistent responses to be resubmitted to the jury. 33
The McCollum court appears to have assumed that when a provision is
included in one part of a statute or rule but not another, the provision
does not apply where it was omitted.34 But it has been consistently held
that this assumption should not be applied rigidly, and not when incon-
sistent with congressional intent or the statute's or rule's purpose. 35 Ap-
plication of this assumption in an interpretation of Rule 49(a) is
inconsistent with the well-established policy that the Federal Rules are to
be construed liberally in order to effectuate the ends of justice and
efficiency.36
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruc-
tion as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the inter-
rogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury
both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general
verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the
verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58. When the answers are
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general ver-
dict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with the an-
swers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for
further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When
the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise incon-
sistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the court
shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall
order a new trial.
33. See id.
34. The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is defined as "[a] maxim of
statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other." Black's Law Dictionary 521 (5th ed. 1979). Courts have often applied this rule in
construing related statutes. See Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983);
Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1983); Marshall
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246, 1251 (3d Cir. 1980); League to Save Lake
Tahoe, Inc. v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943
(1979); J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Vessel Morning Star, 457 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
35. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980); United States
Dep't of Justice v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 727 F.2d 481, 491 (5th Cir. 1984);
National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 648 n.33 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985); Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277
(7th Cir. 1983); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 675-76 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S 951 (1974); Hill v. Whitlock Oil Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d
170, 173 (10th Cir. 1971); FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613, 617-18 (2d
Cir. 1967); Massachusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d
214, 220 (1st Cir. 1963), af'd, 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
36. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983); Reid
Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1305 & n.22 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 279 and 104 S. Ct. 280 (1983); United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon,
642 F.2d 1373, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982); Staren v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976); Plant Economy, Inc. v.
Mirror Insulation Co., 308 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1962), overruled in part on other
grounds, Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 456 F.2d 1084, 1087 (3d Cir. 1972).
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The provisions in Rule 49(b) covering resubmission can be implied
into 49(a) because the two rules cover the same subject 37 and have con-
sistent purposes.38 Both Rule 49(a) and Rule 49(b) cover the use of spe-
cific questions as means of obtaining a verdict.39 Both the questions
submitted under Rule 49(a) and those submitted under Rule 49(b), called
"interrogatories,"' are designed to elicit the jury's findings on the spe-
cific issues in the case.
4
'
The difference between the two rules is that under Rule 49(b) the jury
returns a general verdict in addition to the responses to specific interrog-
atories.42 Also, the questions submitted under Rule 49(a) form the basis
of the court's judgment,43 while the interrogatories submitted under Rule
49(b) are used mainly to test the validity of the general verdict." But
Rule 49(a) questions and Rule 49(b) interrogatories do not always have a
37. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 453 (C. Sands
rev. 4th ed. 1984) (provisions in one statute "which are omitted in another on the same
subject will be applied [where omitted] when the purposes of the two [statutes] are consis-
tent"); see, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (provisions of Bankruptcy
Act applied to Consumer Credit Protection Act); Northcross v. Board of Ed., 412 U.S.
427, 427-28 (1973) (common, general purpose of providing relief from racial discrimina-
tion sufficent to read provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 into Emergency School Aid
Act); United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1187 (6th Cir. 1982) (when "a
problem of interpretation was apparently not foreseen by Congress, it is appropriate to
consult and be guided by those areas covering the same subject where the expression of
legislative intent is clear"), aftd, 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984); United States v. California Port-
land Cement Co., 413 F.2d 161, 166 (9th Cir. 1969) (subsections of Internal Revenue
Code should be construed consistently); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whisnant,
387 F.2d 774, 775 (5th Cir. 1968) (Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act and
Uniform Commercial Code adopted at same session of the legislature and relating in part
to same subject construed together); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d
566, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1963) (Chapters XI and XIII of Bankruptcy Act should be given
similar and harmonious treatment); Kleinfelter v. United States, 318 F.2d 929, 931-32
(Ct. Cl. 1963) (Retirement Act and Veterans Preference Act should be construed to-
gether).
The case for a consistent reading of two statutes is stronger when the statutes were
enacted by the same body at the same time, as were Rules 49(a) and 49(b). See
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S.
60, 64 (1940); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774, 775 (5th
Cir. 1968); 2A N. Singer, supra, § 51.03, at 467-69.
38. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 37, § 51.02, at 453; see, eg., Oscar Meyer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Northcross v. Board of Ed., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)
(per curiam); United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1186-87 (6th Cir.
1982), a]J'd, 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984); In re Robison, 665 F.2d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowden, 624 F.2d 1255, 1265 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a), 49(b).
40. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
41. See, eg., Merchant v. Rukle, 740 F.2d 86, 89 n.2 (1st Cir. 1984); McGill, Inc. v.
John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 671, 676 (Fed. Cir.), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 514 (1984);
Stoddard v. School Dist. No. 1, 590 F.2d 829, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1979); Sperberg v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 715 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
See supra notes 20, 25 and accompanying text.
42. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
43. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text.
44. See, eg., Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1006 (6th Cir. 1983);
Petes v. Hayes, 664 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,
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different function. Rule 49(b) interrogatories, like Rule 49(a) questions,
may form the basis for judgment. Under Rule 49(b), if the general verdict
and the responses to the interrogatories conflict, judgment may not be
entered on the general verdict, but may be entered on the responses to
the interrogatories."a
Despite the fact that the Rule 49(b) interrogatories usually serve a dif-
ferent function than Rule 49(a) questions, the overall purposes of the two
rules are the same. Practice under both sections of Rule 4946 is designed
to guide the jury, increase the reliability of its verdict, and facilitate the
judicial role following a jury trial.47 Because the rules possess these com-
mon purposes, and address the same subjects, the provisions in Rule
49(b) allowing for resubmission can be applied to special verdicts ren-
dered under Rule 49(a). 48
Rule 49(a) must be interpreted not only in light of analogous provi-
sions, but also in light of the goals of the Federal Rules.49 Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules states that every rule "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.""0 Resub-
mission of irreconcilable inconsistencies is swifter and more economical
than the alternative: a new trial on the conflicting findings.5 A rule that
623 F.2d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 1980); Dual Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619
F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b); see, eg., Stoddard v. School Dist. No. 1, 590 F.2d 829,
834 (10th Cir. 1979); Blackwell v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 532 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.
1976) (per curiam); Turner v. Global Seas, Inc., 505 F.2d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1974); Elston
v. Morgan, 440 F.2d 47, 49 (7th Cir. 1971); Giblin v. Beeler, 396 F.2d 584, 588 (10th Cir.
1968).
46. The advantage Rule 49(a) offers over Rule 49(b) is that it is less prone to conflict.
Although Rule 49(a) verdicts can have conflicts among the findings, Rule 49(b) verdicts
add the general verdict as an additional source of conflict, which makes the Rule 49(b)
procedure less reliable than the Rule 49(a) procedure. See Industries, Investments &
Agencies Ltd. v. Panelfab Int'l Corp., 529 F.2d 1203, 1207 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); Wolfe
v. Virusky, 470 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, C.J., concurring); Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 93 n.31 (5th Cir. 1966); Brown, supra note I0,
at 339-40.
47. See Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir.),
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,
725 F.2d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
929 (1980).
48. See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text.
49. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Hensley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
651 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Plant Economy, Inc. v. Mirror Insulation Co.,
308 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1962), overruled in part on other grounds, Torockio v. Cham-
berlain Mfg. Co., 456 F.2d 1084, 1087 (3d Cir. 1972)); Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publi-
cation, Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967); Markham v. Holt, 369 F.2d 940, 942 (5th
Cir. 1966), aff'd, 409 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1969); Rands v. United States, 367 F.2d 186, 189
(9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
51. See Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 575-76 (3d Cir.
1983); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1284
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allows for resubmission is also more just than one that does not. If resub-
mission is not available, the court is faced with the prospect of a new trial
on the conflicting responses.52 To avoid this time-consuming and costly
alternative, judges may decide to resolve inconsistencies themselves, even
though the responses may be essentially irreconcilable.53 When a party
has not waived the right to a jury trial, the resolution of the factual issues
of the case should remain in the hands of the jury. Allowance for resub-
mission will help ensure that it is the jury that resolves the factual issues
in the case.55 Furthermore, the retrials that could result if resubmission
were disallowed could dissuade federal judges from using special verdicts
at all. Numerous judges and commentators have extolled the virtues of
special verdicts.56 Construing Rule 49(a) to permit resubmission would
n.14 (8th Cir. 1981); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402,
407 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
52. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
53. One example of how judges sometimes strain too far in an effort to reconcile
inconsistencies can be seen in Alverez v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 674 F.2d 1037 (5th
Cir. 1982). In this case a seaman brought a negligence action against his employer. Id. at
1038-39. The special verdict the jury returned stated that the plaintiff was not a proxi-
mate cause of the accident, but that he was 90% contributorily negligent. Id. at 1039.
The jury also found that the employer was negligent but that its ship was seaworthy. Id.
Because the responses had not been resubmitted, to avoid a retrial the court of appeals
had to strain to resolve these essentially irreconcilable inconsistencies. See id. at 1041-44.
A rule disallowing resubmission would increase the likelihood that when confronted with
inconsistencies judges will supplant the jury by resolving the factual conflicts in the case.
For cases in which district court judges were reversed after resolving inconsistent re-
sponses, see Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 133, 145-46 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 406.07
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1005
(5th Cir. 1977).
54. See In re Randall, 712 F.2d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir. 1983); Burger King Corp. v.
Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); Gui-
dry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929
(1980); In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 453 U.S. 912 (1980); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Mishler, 526 F.2d 1115, 1117 (2d Cir.
1975); Local 783, Allied Indus. Workers of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 471 F.2d 751, 755
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Pacific Queen Fisheries v. Symes, 307 F.2d
700, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
55. See Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 575-76 (3d Cir.
1983); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. CL 1599 (1984); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. See, eg., Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635, 644 (11 th Cir.
1984) ("wonder to behold"); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d
707, 724 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("particularly useful tool"); Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A.
Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir.) (special verdict procedure "strongly recom-
mended as an appropriate means of guiding a jury, increasing the reliability of its verdict,
and facilitating thejudical role following ajury trial"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984);
Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1071 (5th Cir. 1982) (special verdicts especially
useful in patent cases); Dual Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660, 667
(7th Cir.) (en banc) (special verdicts useful in resolving "specific contested issues"), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979)
("splendid device"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Cote v. Estate of Butler, 518 F.2d
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promote the use of this precise and economical procedure.",
B. The Threat of Coercion
The Fourth Circuit in McCollum v. Stahl "determined that the "ines-
capable implication" the jury derived from resubmission of the verdict
was that the finding on liability should be changed to match the finding
on damages.59 The court of appeals stated that resubmission was "tanta-
mount, in its effect, to a direction to the jury to find liability in order to
warrant the award of damages." ''6
What appeared to have been a coercive procedure to the court, how-
ever, may not have been coercive in fact. The trial court, during resub-
mission, gave no instruction that suggested how the jury should resolve
the conflict. 61 Despite the court of appeals' belief that resubmission con-
stituted a direction that the jury change the finding on liability to match
the damages award, it may be equally likely that resubmission signified to
the jurors that the trial judge wanted them to reduce the damages award
to zero to match their finding on liability. 2 The jury appears to have
157, 160 (2d Cir. 1975) ("prudent expedient for simplifying the issues and for preventing
confusion"); Brown, supra note 10, at 338 ("remarkably effective in fact-resolution");
McCormick, supra note 10, at 181 ("valuable resource").
57. Aside from the Fourth Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit's qualified disapproval of
resubmission in Perricone, all other circuits that have considered the issue have deter-
mined that resubmission is a permissible way to resolve inconsistencies. See Quaker City
Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2676 (1985); Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 575-76 (3d
Cir. 1983); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 616 (10th Cir. 1983);
Skillin v. Kimball, 643 F.2d 19, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1981); Epstein v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 314
F. Supp. 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
58. 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979). For the specific
facts of this case see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 871.
60. Id.
61. The court of appeals nowhere suggests that the judge gave the jury additional
instructions during resubmission. The court of appeals stated that there was an implica-
tion arising from the act of resubmission. At no point did the court of appeals state or
suggest that any coercive statements were made by the trial judge. See id. at 870-71.
62. Resubmission of inconsistent special verdicts does not involve the kind of coer-
cion present when a verdict is resubmitted with an "Allen" charge, also known as a
"dynamite" charge. I E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instruction
§ 5.22, at 163 (3d ed. 1977). An Allen instruction is given to break a deadlocked jury. See
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896); 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Criminal 2d § 502, at 834-35 (2d ed. 1982). These instructions can be inher-
ently coercive, because they are designed to induce jurors holding a minority view to
compromise their positions. See 2 C. Wright, supra, at 836-37.
This inherent coercion is not present when a special verdict is resubmitted. The conflict
in a special verdict is between the findings, not the jurors. No Allen instruction need be
given when a special verdict is resubmitted. The special verdicts can be resubmitted in a
neutral fashion. By identifying the inconsistencies, see infra note 74, and stating the legal
effect of different possible resolutions, see infra note 75, judges can provide a jury the
information it needs to resolve a conflict, thus making any type of coercive Allen charge
unnecessary.
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remained more independent after resubmission than the court of appeals
realized. Although the jurors resolved the inconsistencies in the plaintiff's
favor, they also aided the defendant somewhat by reducing the overall
damages award from $15,000 to $7500.63 Without a supplemental in-
struction pointing the jury toward one specific resolution, 6 it is hard to
see how the jury could infer that the trial judge wanted a particular
result.
This concern over misleading implications arising from resubmission
was also raised in Perricone v. Kansas City Southern Railhay Co.6"
Although the Fifth Circuit did not go so far as to hold resubmission
impermissible as a matter of law, it did state that normally the jury
should not be allowed to reconsider its responses. 66 The court was con-
cerned that the trial judge may have somehow intimated to the jury how
it should resolve the ambiguity in the special verdict.67 This intimation
was not a result of the trial judge's instruction to the jury, which the
court of appeals readily admitted had "nothing coercive or suggestive in
its content. It was phrased in a neutral manner and accurately expressed
the law."6 8 The court of appeals was, however, concerned that the
judge's demeanor and gestures may have influenced the jury:6 9 "[A
judge] can communicate his attitude in a thousand ways from a cocked
eyebrow to a sideways glance."'7 ( This problem, of course, can occur at
any point in a trial, not only on the resubmission of special verdicts.7
The Fifth Circuit itself stated that the only true protection against such
behavior is the good faith and integrity of our federal judges.7 We rely
on this good faith and integrity throughout a trial; there is no reason to
stop relying on it when a faulty verdict must be resubmitted.
A proper instruction to the jury when a special verdict is resubmitted 3
63. See id. at 871.
64. As long as an objection is made to the instruction at trial, litigants are protected
by appellate review from any patent manipulation of the jury. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; see
also Robison v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101, 1112 (7th Cir. 1983) (right to raise objection
on appeal to instruction given at trial lost only if no objection was made at trial); DeHues
v. Western Elec. Co., 710 F.2d 1344, 1346 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Barnett v. Housing
Auth. of Atlanta, 707 F.2d 1571, 1580 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (same); Greiner v. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1976) (same) ; Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 490 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
65. 704 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. See id. at 1379.
67. See id. at 1378.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See Crandell v. United States, 703 F.2d 74, 74-78 (4th Cir. 1983); Bentley v.
Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1981); Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co.,
569 F.2d 459, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pfizer Inc., 560 F.2d 319, 322-23
(8th Cir. 1977); Greener v. Green, 460 F.2d 1279, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1972).
72. Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1378-79.
73. Rather than resubmitting the conflicting findings, inconsistencies can be resolved
by submitting to the jury a supplemental interrogatory that covers only the conflict. This
method of resolving inconsistencies was approved by the Fifth Circuit in Morrison v.
1985] 1099
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
should state why an inconsistency has resulted.74 To aid the jury in
resolving the conflict, the instruction should also explain the legal effects
of possible resolutions.75
II. OBJECTING TO INCONSISTENCIES IN SPECIAL VERDICTS
The courts of appeals are in conflict over whether the failure to object
to inconsistencies at trial causes a waiver of the right to raise the objec-
tion on appeal.7 6 Those courts that decline to apply a waiver rule do so
because of the absence of a provision in Rule 49(a) requiring that objec-
tions to inconsistencies be made at trial.77 Other courts favor application
Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F.2d 154, 161 (5th Cir. 1977). See Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 575 (3d Cir. 1983); Aquachem Co. v. Olin Corp., 699 F.2d
516, 521 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. 0.78 Acres of Land, More or Less, 81
F.R.D. 618, 621-22 (E.D. Pa.), affid mem., 609 F.2d 504 (3d Cir.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
In re Moyer Packing Co., 609 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1979); ef. Croce v. Kurnit, 737 F.2d 229,
234 (2d Cir. 1984) (when issue was originally omitted from special verdict questions
"matter of whether to submit a postverdict interrogatory was wholly within the discre-
tion of the trial judge").
74. In the cases in which resubmission has been allowed, the courts did not discuss
whether the trial judge should point out the inconsistencies to the jury. In Texas, where
special verdicts are commonly used, trial judges are required to identify the conflicting
findings for the jury. See Pon Lip Chew v. Gilliland, 398 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex. 1965);
A.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 Tex. 89, 91, 148 S.W.2d 392, 393 (1941) (per curiam);
Harris County v. Patrick, 636 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); British Overseas
Airways Corp. v. Tours and Travel of Houston, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978); Garcia v. Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971);
McCarty v. Morrison, 461 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
468 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1971); Tex. R. Civ. P. 295. The Texas rule on this point should be
applied by the federal courts. Having the trial judge identify the inconsistencies for the
jury will bring about the most expeditious resolution and will ensure that the jury under-
stands that resubmission is taking place because there is a definite inconsistency, not be-
cause the judge is dissatisfied with whom the verdict favors.
75. Most judges and commentators now agree that it is an acceptable practice to
inform the jury of the legal consequences of its responses. See Vinieris v. Byzantine Mari-
time Corp., 731 F.2d 1061, 1065 (2d Cir. 1984) (first decision to hold that failure to
inform the jury of the legal consequences of its responses may be reversible error); Per-
ricone v. Kansas City S. Ry., 704 F.2d 1376, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983) (proper to tell the jury
the legal effects of its responses); Lowery v. Clouse, 348 F.2d 252, 259-61 (8th Cir. 1965)
(same); Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D. La. 1975) ("jury
is not to be set loose in a maze of factual questions, to be answered without intelligent
awareness of the consequences"); Truitt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 67, 73 (S.D.
Tex. 1959) (court instructed jury how questions should be answered in order to reach the
legal effect the jury desired), af'd, 280 F.2d 784, 790 (5th Cir. 1960); 9 C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 1, § 2509, at 513 (preferable rule is to allow jury to know legal effects
of its answers); Brown, supra note 10, at 341 (jury is aware of legal effects of its answers);
Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D. 199, 204-06 (1966) (ar-
guing against following Texas and Wisconsin systems of blindfolding the jury as to the
effects of its answers). But see Gullet v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1100,
1105 (7th Cir. 1971) (comments on the legal effects of answers to special verdict questions
are improper); Krolikowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 889, 891-92 (7th Cir. 1960)
(same); Thedorf v. Lipsey, 237 F.2d 190, 193-94 (7th Cir. 1956) (same).
76. Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984).
77. See id.; Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 144-45
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984); Alverez v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 674
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of a waiver rule to promote efficiency and to deter litigants from using
inconsistencies as a means of obtaining a second opportunity at a
favorable judgment.7"
Although Rule 49(a) is silent on when objections must be made,79 Rule
51 is not: "No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give
an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection."8" On its face, application of Rule 51 to incon-
sistent responses in special verdicts seems inappropriate because the Rule
is concerned with objections that must be made before the jury retires to
deliberate; it does not explictly address objections that must be made af-
ter the jury has returned its verdict. Nevertheless, the intent of Rule 51
should govern Rule 49(a) inconsistencies."' The Tenth Circuit, holding
that Rule 51 should be applied to Rule 49(a), stated: "'The purpose of
Rule 51 is to prevent a litigant from taking advantage of an error which
could be rectified by the court if called to its attention by timely and
specific objection.' "82 If brought to the court's attention at trial, incon-
F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982); Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946, 947 (5th
Cir. 1982); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1977); Griffin v. Matherne,
471 F.2d 911, 917-18 (5th Cir. 1973); Stephenson v. College Misericordia, 376 F. Supp.
1324, 1326-27 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
78. See, eg., Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 837 (9th Cir. 1984); Bell v.
Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 616 (10th Cir. 1983); Skillin v. Kimball, 643 F.2d 19, 19-20 (1st
Cir. 1981); Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 229 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979);
Seven Provinces Ins. Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 65 F.R.D. 674, 690 (W.D. Mo.
1975); cf. Stancill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 529, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1974)
(failure to move at trial that inconsistent findings rendered under Rule 49(b) be resubmit-
ted to jury results in a waiver of right to object on appeal); Barnes v. Brown, 430 F.2d
578, 580 (7th Cir. 1970) (same); Kirkendoll v. Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694, 698-99 (10th Cir.
1967) (same).
79. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
80. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
81. Many courts have applied the.provisions of Rule 51 to Rule 49(a) in other con-
texts not involving the resubmission of inconsistencies. See Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking
Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1006 (6th Cir. 1983) (Rule 51 applied to Rule 49(a) on whether
counsel must be informed that special verdict questions are to be submitted); Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1981) (Rule 51 applied to Rule 49(a) on
whether counsel is entitled to object to form of questions out of hearing of jury), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1978) (Rule 51
applied to Rule 49(a) on whether counsel must be shown exact text of special verdict
questions prior to submission to the jury); Clegg v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 264
F.2d 152, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1959) (Rule 51 applied to Rule 49(a) on whether court must
notify counsel that special verdicts are to be used); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mann-
heim, Ger., 586 F. Supp. 711, 723-24 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (Rule 51 applied to Rule 49(a) on
whether counsel must be shown exact text of special questions prior to submission to the
jury); Kushner v. Hendon Constr., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 93, 97-98 (M.D. Pa.) (same), aff'd
mem., 609 F.2d 502 (3d Cir.), affid mem. sub nor. Hendon Constr. Inc. v. Naholnik, 609
F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979). Applying the overall intent of Rule 51 to Rule 49(a) on the issue
of resubmission would promote economy and fairness.
82. Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 616 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting Corriz v. Naranjo,
667 F.2d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 458 U.S. 1123 (1982));
see Taylor v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1971); Smith v.
Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 836 (10th Cir. 1951).
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sistencies can be resolved by resubmission to the jury.83
If not required to object to inconsistencies at trial, litigants may be able
to obtain a second chance for a favorable verdict and judgment. A liti-
gant aware of an inconsistency could allow the district court to render a
judgment, and then object to the inconsistencies on appeal if that judg-
ment was adverse, thus securing a second chance for a favorable verdict
and judgment.84 The application of a waiver rule would prevent litigants
from engaging in this kind of gamesmanship.85
By requiring litigants to bring all inconsistencies to the court's atten-
tion before judgment has been rendered and the jury has been dis-
charged, the court can resolve conflicts by resubmitting them to the jury.
This procedure is swifter and more economical than allowing inconsis-
tencies to be raised after the jury has been discharged and then permit-
ting a new trial on the conflicting responses.86
III. LOCATING THE INCONSISTENCIES
Requiring that objections to inconsistencies be made before the jury is
discharged may be unfair if counsel is not allowed sufficient time to de-
tect inconsistencies. Many special verdicts are composed of twenty or
83. For a discussion of resubmission, see Pt. I.
84. See Skillin v. Kimball, 643 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1981) ("To allow a new trial after
the objecting party failed to seek a proper remedy at the only possible time would under-
mine the incentives for efficient trial procedure and would allow the possible misuse of
Rule 49 procedures . . . by parties anxious to implant a ground for appeal should the
jury's opinion prove distasteful to them.").
85. Allowing such tactics to take place would violate the Federal Rules' goals of re-
ducing surprise and deception. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962) (Federal
Rules reject notion that litigation is a game of skill); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957) (same); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182, 1186 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1973) (same); Central Distribs., Inc. v. M.E.T., Inc., 403 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir.
1968) (Federal Rules adopted to end "sporting theory of justice"), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 428 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1970); Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d
103, 105-06 (10th Cir. 1967) (Federal Rules reject notion that litigation is game of skill);
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961) (purpose of Federal
Rules is to take "sporting element out of litigation"); Meadow Gold Prods. Co. v.
Wright, 278 F.2d 867, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Federal Rules adopted "to get away from
legal sparring and fencing, and from surprise moves of litigants"); FRA S.p.A. v. Surg-O-
Flex of Am., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Federal Rules not designed
"to outfit a party with tactical armaments for delay and harassment of his adversary");
Mahler v. Drake, 43 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.S.C. 1967) ("old concept of litigation as a battle of
wits is to be eliminated"); Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387, 389 (N.D. Ohio 1967)
(Federal Rules "not designed for playing games").
86. See Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 575-76 (3d Cir.
1983) ("terribly inefficient not to obtain clarification from a still-empaneled jury of the
meaning of its answers"); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 n.5 (1 th
Cir. 1983) (resolving inconsistencies at trial conserves "valuable judicial resources"), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); Skillin v. Kimball, 643 F.2d 19, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1981)
(only efficient time for inconsistencies to be cured is before jury is discharged); Fugitt v.
Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977) (inconsistencies can be resolved "with relative
ease" if objection is made while the jury is at hand).
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more questions,87 so inconsistencies may not be apparent at first glance. 8
One way the court can aid in the swift detection of inconsistencies is to
allow counsel to examine the special questions and accompanying in-
structions for potential inconsistencies.8 9 If counsel is familiar with the
special questions and instructions, inconsistencies are more likely to be
detected quickly and precisely once the special verdict has been returned
from the jury.
The courts of appeals are split regarding what prior notice should be
given to counsel about the content of special questions and their accom-
panying instructions. Three circuits have held that it is within the district
court's discretion whether counsel may see the special questions and in-
structions before they are sent to the jury.9° These courts have reached
this result by applying the generally accepted interpretation of Rule 51's
notice requirement.91 Although Rule 51 provides that the court must in-
87. See, e.g., Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1963) (negligence
action; 22 questions); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1978) (medical malprac-
tice action; 49 questions); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 916 (4th Cir. 1976)
(securities fraud action; 52 questions); Griffin v. Matherne, 471 F.2d 911,913-14 (5th Cir.
1973) (negligence action; 28 questions); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983,
988, 1021-27 (D. Conn. 1978) (patent/antitrust action; 54 questions), aff'd and re-
manded, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); Envirex, Inc.
v. Ecological Recovery Assocs., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1329, 1339, 1341-47 (M.D. Pa. 1978)
(breach of contract action; 51 questions), affid mem., 601 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979).
88. Even if a special verdict contains only a few questions, inconsistencies still may
take time to identify. For example, in Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co.,
734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984), the special verdict consisted of
only three questions. See id. at 144 & n.3. The case involved a complex area of the Penn-
sylvania common law of civil conspiracy. See id. at 145. Although there were only three
questions, the court of appeals required two pages to explain why an inconsistency had
occurred. See id. at 145-46. The court found that one of the questions was "woefully
ambiguous" and that "the jury instructions treated this very complex subject in legal
terms somewhat lacking in perspicuity." Id. at 146. Even if a special verdict contains only
a few questions, it may still take time to locate an inconsistency if the questions were
poorly drafted or involve a complex area of the law.
89. See infra note 101.
90. See Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1006 (6th Cir. 1983) (trial
judge need only give counsel "substance" of special verdict questions, not exact text of
special questions); Cramer v. Hoffman, 390 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1968) (court has discre-
tion whether to show special verdict questions to counsel); Clegg v. Hardware Mut. Casu-
alty Co., 264 F.2d 152, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1959) (court is not compelled to show special
verdict questions to counsel prior to summation); see also Cutlass Prods., Inc. v.
Bregman, 682 F.2d 323, 330 (2d Cir. 1982) (court has discretion whether to show special
verdict questions to counsel prior to submission, but abuse of discretion may be found if
counsel was not shown questions in complex cases).
91. See Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1006 (6th Cir. 1983) (per-
mitting trial judge not to show special verdict questions and instructions to counsel is in
accord with "generally accepted interpretation of Rule 51 that in the federal courts coun-
sel have no right to be apprised of the exact language of any instruction"); Cramer v.
Hoffman, 390 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1968) (denying plaintiff's claim that Rule 51 requires
that counsel be supplied with the special verdict questions prior to summation); Clegg v.
Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 152, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1959) (Rule 51 requires that
counsel be told special verdict questions will be submitted, but does not require that
counsel be shown those questions).
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form counsel how it has acted on proposed charges submitted by coun-
sel,92 many federal courts have held that this provision places no
obligation on the judge to disclose to counsel the exact language of the
actual instructions. 9
3
The better view is that adopted by the Third Circuit, which has held
that district courts must disclose the exact form of the special questions
and instructions before submission to the jury.94 This gives counsel an
excellent opportunity to prepare for inconsistencies. In addition, counsel
may be able to make suggestions on the wording and organization of the
questions, thus possibly preventing inconsistencies from occurring at
all.95
Moreover, counsel should be allowed to see the special questions and
instructions before they go to the jury because of the Rule 49(a) provision
concerning omissions.96 No objection to an omitted issue is allowed if
counsel did not move to have that issue submitted to the jury before the
jury was given the special verdict form.97 It would be unfair to deem that
the right to have an issue submitted to the jury has been waived if coun-
sel never had the chance to examine the verdict form to determine if all
92. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 states in part:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court in-
struct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the
jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed.
93. See Dunn v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 370 F.2d 681, 683 (10th Cir. 1966); Garland v,
Material Serv. Corp., 291 F.2d 861, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1961); Puggioni v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 286 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1961); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 767 (10th Cir.
1951); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Sullivan, 108 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1940); Taylor
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 320 F. Supp. 1381, 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afid, 436 F.2d 416
(3d Cir. 1970); cf Martin v. United States, 404 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir. 1968) (under
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, trial
judge need not show jury instructions to counsel).
94. See Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1978); see also In re Air Crash
Disaster at Mannheim, Ger., 586 F. Supp. 711, 723-24 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (following rule of
Smith v. Danyo); Kushner v. Hendon Constr., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 93, 98 (M.D. Pa.) (same),
afFd mem., 609 F.2d 502 (3d Cir.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Hendon Constr. Inc. v.
Naholnik, 609 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979).
95. See Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[G]iving counsel an oppor-
tunity to comment upon the proposed interrogatories is an obvious safeguard against
inadvertent confusion or error in their preparation .... Indeed, the time so spent might
often improve the interrogatories and thus result in a more orderly, and shorter, jury
deliberation."); see also Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 616 (10th Cir. 1983) (court
attempted to avoid vagueness in special verdict questions by reviewing questions with
counsel prior to submission); Guidry v. Kem Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1979)
(inconsistencies might have been avoided if counsel had assisted court in framing the
special questions).
96. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
97. Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472 (1st Cir. 1985); Quaker City Gear Works, Inc.
v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2676 (1985);
Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1984); Bell v. City
of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1254 n.62 (7th Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
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the issues were covered adequately.9"
If the jury is discharged hastily, however, inconsistencies may remain
undiscovered even if counsel have diligently studied99 the special ques-
tions and instructions before and after submission to the jury. 10 If time
is not allowed for a careful examination of the special verdict after it has
been returned by the jury, a waiver rule may be prejudicial to litigants. 101
To avoid such a result, the court should hold the jury for a reasonable
time proportionate to the length or complexity of the special verdict so
that counsel can examine the verdict carefully.
98. See Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1336-37 (10th Cir.
1984) (court held that appellant had waived right to a jury trial on specific issue, but
noted that appellant had been given chance to examine verdict form before its submission
to jury); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1978) (if counsel is not shown interrog-
atories before submission, "counsel will have been deprived of the opportunity to request
instructions on ... significant issues"); Cote v. Estate of Butler, 518 F.2d 157, 160 (2d
Cir. 1975) (noting that counsel had been given opportunity to examine special verdict
questions); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannlheim, Ger., 586 F. Supp. 711, 723-24 (M.D.
Pa. 1984) (counsel is deprived of chance to ensure that all issues are submitted unless
shown special questions prior to submission).
99. Of course, allowing counsel to see the special verdict questions and instructions
before they are submitted to the jury is only effective in preventing inconsistencies if
counsel is diligent in examining the material both before and after submission. This point
was stressed by the Eleventh Circuit: "A very cursory reading of the verdict form would
have uncovered the inadequacies of the verdict. Had the attorneys examined the verdict
with the same degree of vigor with which they pursued their cause at the trial ... ,
valuable judicial resources could have been conserved." Burger King Corp. v. Mason,
710 F.2d 1480, 1489 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984).
100. If the special verdict is long, it is very possible that the jury will be dismissed
before counsel have been able to discover inconsistencies. See supra note 87 and accompa-
nying text.
101. Many courts, in determining whether application of a waiver rule would be preju-
dicial when inconsistencies have resulted under Rules 49(a) and 49(b), have considered
whether counsel was given sufficient time to examine the verdict and whether the trial
judge asked counsel if they were satisfied with the verdict before dismissing the jury. See
Perricone v. Kansas City S. Ry., 704 F.2d 1376, 1379 (5th Cir. 1983) ("we will not listen
to counsel complain about the [special verdict].., when he then uttered not a peep-
even though the judge specifically invited any objection"); Wagner v. International Har-
vester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 229 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979) (appellant "expressly declined to have
the jury resume its deliberations in an effort to resolve any inconsistency in the verdict
answers at issue here"); Staneill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 529, 535 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("trial judge was careful to solicit objections from both counsel after the ver-
dict was rendered"); Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 416
F.2d 1192, 1200 (6th Cir. 1969) (trial judge asked counsel if they had any objections to
make before dismissal of jury), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970); Cundiff v. Washburn,
393 F.2d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 1968) (trial judge asked if counsel wanted inconsistencies
resubmitted to jury); Kirkendoll v. Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1967) ("court
asked if there was any reason why the jury should not be discharged"); Employers Casu-
alty Co. v. Dupaquier, 338 F.2d 336, 337 (5th Cir. 1964) ("inconsistencies as existed
between answer to special interrogatory and jury's general verdict were apparent in ample
time for defendant to have moved for resubmission to jury"). These two factors-s-suf-
cient time for review and notice of impending dismissal of the jury-should be considered
before a court of appeals determines that a waiver rule should be applied in an individual
case.
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CONCLUSION
Special verdicts aid the jury in understanding cases with numerous and
complex legal and factual issues. In all types of cases, special verdicts
often prevent or limit retrials. To further the use of special verdicts in
federal courts, uniform approaches should be followed in resolving in-
consistencies among the findings.
The most efficient way to resolve inconsistencies is by resubmitting
them to the jury because that procedure eliminates the need for a costly
and time-consuming retrial. Resubmitting inconsistencies also ensures
that the jury, not the judge, resolves all the issues that were submitted to
the jury. To assist counsel in locating inconsistencies, the trial judge
should allow counsel to see the special questions and instructions before
they are submitted to the jury. After the special verdict has been returned
from the jury, the trial judge should hold the jury long enough for coun-
sel to make a careful examination of the special verdict. To prevent
gamesmanship and to achieve the Federal Rules' goals of economy and
efficiency, litigants should be required to object to inconsistencies before
the jury is discharged. If followed, these procedures will minimize the
problems caused by inconsistencies and therefore maximize the use of
special verdicts in the federal courts.
Donald Olander
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